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MOORE V. TEXAS: BALANCING
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ADVANCEMENTS WITH JUDICIAL
STABILITY
EMILY TAFT *
INTRODUCTION
In the 2016 election, voters in California, Nebraska, and Oklahoma
reviewed the death penalty through referenda.1 The initiative in
California, which was to remove the death penalty altogether, failed.2
This was the second time that such a measure has failed there.3
Oklahoma voters were deciding whether or not to preserve the death
penalty within the state’s constitution.4 This constitutional amendment
passed.5 In Nebraska, where voters were deciding whether to overturn
the state legislature’s ban on the death penalty, the death penalty again
prevailed.6 Public approval for the death penalty remains fairly high,
and a pro-death penalty sentiment among the electorate seems to
predominate.7
The trend at the United States Supreme Court tells a different story.
Generally, the Supreme Court has carved away at the death penalty
with each new case it takes up.8 In Atkins v. Virginia,9 the Court
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8. Elizabeth Schumacher, Texas on Trial for Using Fictional Character in Death Penalty
Cases, DEUTSCHE WELLE (Oct. 29, 2016), http://dw.com/p/2Rsq6.
9. 536 U.S. 304 (2002).
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recognized that the Eighth Amendment bars the execution of an
individual who is intellectually disabled.10 In Hall v. Florida,11 the Court
required that a State’s legal determination of intellectual disability
must be “informed by the medical community’s diagnostic
framework.”12 Because of continued public support, however, many
believe that it will still be a while before the Court considers a
nationwide ban.13 This was evident when the Court decided to hear
Moore v. Texas.14 Initially, the Court considered addressing the
constitutionality of the death penalty,15 but quickly limited review to
one question: whether the Eighth Amendment requires States to
adhere to a particular organization’s most recent clinical definition of
intellectual disability in determining whether a person is exempt from
the death penalty under Atkins and Hall.16
This commentary argues that the Supreme Court should find for
Texas because the state’s intellectual disability determination is
consistent with the Eighth Amendment under Atkins and Hall.17
Further, requiring states to change their frameworks based on the
current medical definition at the time will cause judicial instability. Part
I summarizes the factual and procedural history of Moore v. Texas, and
Part II explains the legal background of the death penalty and
intellectual disability. Part III presents the Texas Court of Criminal
Appeals (CCA) holding and rationale, and Part IV explores the
arguments set forth by the Petitioner and the Respondent. Part V then
analyzes how the Supreme Court should rule on Moore based on the
Court’s precedent and the associated policy implications.
I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
On April 25, 1980, Petitioner Bobby James Moore and two other
individuals robbed the Birdsall Super Market in Houston, Texas.18

10. Id. at 320.
11. 134 S. Ct. 1986 (2014).
12. Id. at 2000.
13. Schumacher, supra note 8.
14. Order Granting Cert., Moore v. Texas, No. 15-797 (U.S. June 6, 2016) [hereinafter Orde
Granting Cert.].
15. Adam Liptak, Supreme Court to Hear Death Penalty Cases, N.Y. TIMES (June 6, 2016),
http://www.nytimes.com/2016/06/07/us/politics/supreme-court-to-hear-two-major-death-penaltycases.html?_r=1.
16. Brief for the Respondent at i, Moore v. Texas, No. 15-797 (U.S. Sept. 6, 2016)
[hereinafter Brief for Respondent].
17. Hall v. Florida, 134 S. Ct. 1986 (2014).
18. Ex parte Moore, 470 S.W.3d 481, 490 (Tex. Crim. App. 2015).
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Moore supplied the weapons for the robbery and agreed to guard the
courtesy booth while one of the accomplices planned to take the
money.19 As they entered the store, one of the accomplices demanded
money from the two clerks.20 Moore pointed a gun at the two clerks,
causing one of the clerks to cry out that the store was being robbed.21
Moore then pointed the gun at the clerk and shot him in the head.22 He
died instantly.23 Moore and his accomplices quickly fled the scene.24
Witnesses gave the police the license-plate number and a
description of the getaway car, which allowed law enforcement to
apprehend and arrest one of the accomplices.25 The car was searched,
and the police found the other accomplice’s wallet, causing him to turn
himself into the police.26 Based on interviews with the two accomplices,
law enforcement issued a warrant for Moore’s arrest, but Moore
evaded police until he was found at his grandmother’s house in
Louisiana several weeks later.27 Moore admitted to the robbery and the
clerk’s death, but insisted the death was an accident.28 The jury found
him guilty of capital murder.29 At the punishment phase, Moore
accepted the stipulation in his penitentiary packet, which outlined his
medical and familial history, and the jury sentenced him to death.30
Over the next twenty years, Moore filed several habeas corpus
petitions, motions for a stay of execution, and applications alleging
ineffective assistance of counsel, but received no relief.31
Then, in August 2002, “[d]espite having argued at the punishment
retrial that [he] was not intellectually disabled[,] and having presented
the testimony of two experts to support that theory,” Moore claimed
that he was intellectually disabled and sought relief under Atkins.32 The
CCA denied Moore’s motion to stay his execution until the Texas
legislature responded to the Atkins ruling.33 On June 17, 2003, Moore’s
19.
20.
21.
22.
23.
24.
25.
26.
27.
28.
29.
30.
31.
32.
33.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 491.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 492.
See id. at 492–504 (detailing Moore’s motions).
Id. at 504.
Id.
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counsel filed a final habeas petition stating that he was intellectually
disabled and thus could not be executed.34 However, Moore filed a pro
se motion to waive further appeal and to set his execution date, and he
refused any psychological examinations.35 The district court ordered
that the habeas proceeding continue and appointed a pool of mental
health experts for both parties to use.36 Moore put on three experts: two
found him intellectually disabled, one did not; and the State put on one
expert, who found him sane and competent.37 After a two-day Atkins
hearing, the habeas court found that Moore was intellectually disabled
and recommended that CCA grant relief on Moore’s Atkins claim, but
the CCA denied relief.38 On June 6, 2016, the Supreme Court granted
certiorari.39
II. LEGAL BACKGROUND
A. Atkins v. Virginia
The first case to address how states handle intellectual disability
with regards to the death penalty was Atkins v. Virginia.40 In Atkins, the
Supreme Court held that the execution of intellectually disabled
individuals violates the Eighth Amendment.41 The Court found that
while mentally disabled people should be tried and punished for their
crimes, “their disabilities in areas of reasoning, judgment, and control
of their impulses” do not allow them to act with the “level of moral
culpability that characterizes the most serious adult criminal
conduct.”42 The Court went on to say that the “dignity of man” is the
“basic concept underlying the Eighth Amendment,” and so the
“Amendment must draw its meaning from the evolving standards of
decency that mark the progress of a maturing society.”43 The Court

34. Id.
35. Id. at 505.
36. Id. at 506, 508–09.
37. Brief for Petitioner at 8–10, Moore v. Texas, No. 15-797 (U.S. July 28, 2016) [hereinafter
Brief for Petitioner].
38. Ex parte Moore, 470 S.W.3d at 513.
39. Order Granting Cert., supra note 14.
40. 536 U.S. 304 (2002).
41. See id. at 317, 320 (prohibiting the execution of persons with intellectual disability, but
leaving to the states “the task of developing appropriate ways to enforce the constitutional
restriction”).
42. Id. at 306.
43. Id. at 311–12 (quoting Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 100–01 (1958)).
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concluded that “pursuant to our narrowing jurisprudence, which seeks
to ensure that only the most deserving of execution are put to death, an
exclusion for the mentally retarded is appropriate.”44
The Court then noted that the medical community at the time had
a three-factor definition of intellectual disability: (1) “significantly sub
average intellectual functioning,” (2) “deficits in adaptive functioning
(the inability to learn basic skills and adjust behavior to changing
circumstances),” and (3) “onset of these deficits during the
developmental period.”45 Nevertheless, the Court left it to the states to
determine the best way to enforce this constitutional restriction.46
These state statutory definitions do not need to be identical, but must
“generally conform to the clinical definitions.”47 After Atkins, some
state courts and legislatures, including Texas, adopted the three-prong
test outlined in Atkins, but others formulated their own standards.48
B. Hall v. Florida
After Atkins, Florida implemented a rigid IQ cut-off for
determining intellectual disability: “If, from test scores, a prisoner is
deemed to have an IQ above 70, all further exploration of intellectual
disability is foreclosed.”49 The Court in Hall v. Florida found that this
rigid requirement “creates an unacceptable risk that persons with
intellectual disability will be executed, and thus is unconstitutional.”50
The Court considered the fact that only nine of the thirty-two states
that allow the death penalty mandate a strict IQ cut-off, which suggests
an “objective indicia of society’s standards” leaning away from a rigid
IQ test.51
Further, the Court considered the medical community’s
understanding of intellectual disability.52 In Hall, the Court again
stressed that state statutory definitions do not need to be identical, but
do need to “generally conform to the clinical definitions” by stating
that a state’s legal determination of intellectual disability must be

44. Id. at 319.
45. Id. at 308 n.3.
46. See id. at 317 (internal citations omitted) (declaring that it left “to the States the task of
developing appropriate ways to enforce the constitutional restriction”).
47. Id.
48. Brief for Respondent, supra note 16, at 25–27.
49. Hall v. Florida, 134 S. Ct. 1986, 1990 (2014).
50. Id.
51. Id. at 1997.
52. Id. at 2000.
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“informed by the medical community’s diagnostic framework.”53 The
question that remained, which is addressed in Moore, is how closely
state frameworks must conform to current medical standards for
intellectual disability.
Justice Alito, in his dissent in Hall, found that because the views of
professional medical associations often change and fluctuate, “tying
Eighth Amendment law to these views will lead to instability and
continue to fuel protracted litigation.”54
C. The Current Situation in Texas
The seminal case in Texas after Atkins was Ex parte Briseno.55 The
CCA in Briseno adopted the definition of intellectual disability stated
in Atkins and in the ninth edition of the American Association on
Mental Retardation (AAMR) manual, published in 1992.56 Because it
found that “determining what constitutes mental retardation in a
particular case varies sharply depending upon who performs the
analysis and the methodology used,” the court provided seven
additional factors to assist courts in assessing death penalty habeas
petitions:

53.
54.
55.
56.

•

Did those who knew the person best during the
developmental stage—his family, friends, teachers,
employers, authorities—think he was mentally retarded at
that time, and, if so, act in accordance with that
determination?

•

Has the person formulated plans and carried them through
or is his conduct impulsive?

•

Does his conduct show leadership or does it show that he is
led around by others?

•

Is his conduct in response to external stimuli rational and
appropriate, regardless of whether it is socially acceptable?

•

Does he respond coherently, rationally, and on point to oral
or written questions, or do his responses wander from
subject to subject?

Id.
Id. at 2006 (Alito, J., dissenting).
135 S.W.3d 1 (Tex. Crim. App. 2004).
Id. at 8 (citing Atkins, 536 U.S. at 308 n.3 (citing THE AMERICAN ASSOCIATION ON
MENTAL RETARDATION, MENTAL RETARDATION: DEFINITION, CLASSIFICATION, AND
SYSTEMS OF SUPPORTS (9th ed. 1992) [hereinafter AAMR 9th])).
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•

Can the person hide facts or lie effectively in his own or
others’ interests?

•

Putting aside any heinousness or gruesomeness
surrounding the capital offense, did the commission of that
offense require forethought, planning, and complex
execution of purpose?57

121

In Ex parte Cathey,58 the CCA explicitly stated that these “factors
are not part of the definition of ‘intellectual disability,’ and trial and
appellate courts may ignore some or all of them if they are not helpful
in a particular case.”59 The Texas legislature has not taken up the issue
of how to define intellectual disability, so the framework established in
Briseno still stands as Texas’s legal framework today.60
D. The Current Situation in Other States
Applying the “evolving standards of decency” test for the Eighth
Amendment, the Court in both Atkins and Hall found the trends
among the states probative to its decisions.61 Since Hall, most state
courts have held that “current medical standards should be considered
in resolving Atkins claims.”62 Today, four states have adopted the latest
clinical definition of the American Psychological Association (APA) or
the American Association on Intellectual and Developmental
Disabilities (AAIDD) wholesale,63 while twenty-four states, including
Texas, continue to use an earlier articulation of the test.64
Furthermore, a majority of federal circuit courts have accepted that
Atkins does not require any particular clinical definition as the legal
standard.65 There is no consensus among states about which medical
57. Id. at 8–9.
58. 451 S.W.3d 1 (Tex. Crim. App. 2014).
59. Id. at 10 n.22.
60. Ex parte Moore, 470 S.W.3d 481, 486 (Tex. Crim. App. 2015).
61. Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 317 (2002); Hall v. Florida, 134 S. Ct. 1986, 1996 (2014).
62. Brief for Petitioner, supra note 37, at 48; see, e.g., Oats v. State, 181 So. 3d 457, 467–68
(Fla. 2015); State v. Agee, 364 P.3d 971, 989–91 (Or. 2015); Chase v. State, 171 So. 3d 463, 471
(Miss. 2015); cf. Commonwealth v. Bracey, 117 A.3d 270, 273–74 nn.4–5 (Pa. 2015) (holding that
an Atkins claim resolved using AAIDD or DSM manual current at time of Atkins hearing).
63. See, e.g., LA. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 905.5.1(H) (2016) (adopting DSM-5); Chase
v. State, 171 So. 3d 463, 471 (Miss. 2015) (en banc) (adopting DSM-5 and AAIDD 11th); State v.
Agee, 364 P.3d 971, 990 (Or. 2015) (adopting DSM-5); Commonwealth v. Bracey, 117 A.3d 270,
273 (Pa. 2015) (approving AAIDD 11th as alternative to DSM-IV-TR).
64. Brief for Respondent, supra note 16, at 17.
65. Id. at 22; see Hooks v. Workman, 689 F.3d 1148, 1172 (10th Cir. 2012); Chester v. Thaler,
666 F.3d 340, 347 (5th Cir. 2011); Hill v. Humphrey, 662 F.3d 1335, 1351–52 (11th Cir. 2011) (en
banc); Sasser v. Norris, 553 F.3d 1121, 1125 n.3 (8th Cir. 2009), abrogated on other grounds by
Wood v. Milyard, 132 S. Ct. 1826 (2012); Larry v. Branker, 552 F.3d 356, 369 (4th Cir. 2009).
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definition of intellectual disability should be used, but there is a
consensus that medical expertise must be taken into account when
determining intellectual disability in the context of the death penalty.66
III. HOLDING
The CCA found that Moore is not intellectually disabled under the
Briseno framework and thereby concluded that it is not
unconstitutional to execute him.67 The CCA first determined that the
Briseno framework remains adequately “informed by the medical
community’s diagnostic framework.”68 In particular, the Briseno
framework states:
To demonstrate that he is intellectually disabled for Eighth
Amendment purposes and therefore exempt from execution, an
applicant must prove by a preponderance of the evidence that: (1)
he suffers from significantly sub-average general intellectual
functioning, generally shown by an intelligence quotient (IQ) of 70
or less; (2) his significantly sub-average general intellectual
functioning is accompanied by related and significant limitations in
adaptive functioning; and (3) the onset of the above two
characteristics occurred before the age of eighteen.69

The court noted that, while the AAIDD and APA have modified
their definitions since Briseno, the authority to change the legal
framework rests in the Texas legislature or the CCA, so the habeas
court must follow the CCA’s precedent.70
Next, the CCA analyzed each prong of the Briseno test to
determine whether Moore is intellectually disabled. For the first prong,
Moore has failed to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that he
“ha[d] significantly sub-average general intellectual functioning.”71
After careful analysis of the several IQ tests administered to Moore
throughout his life and the positives and negatives of each type of test,
the CCA determined that his Wechsler Intelligence Scale for Children
(WISC) IQ score of 78 and his Wechsler Adult Intelligence Scale-

66. See Hall, 134 S. Ct. at 2000 (“[T]his Court and the States have placed substantial reliance
on the expertise of the medical profession.”).
67. Ex parte Moore, 470 S.W.3d 481, 486 (Tex. Crim. App. 2015).
68. Id. at 487 (quoting Hall, 134 S. Ct. at 2000).
69. Id. at 486; see Ex parte Briseno, 135 S.W.3d 1, 7 n.25 (Tex. Crim. App. 2004); see also Ex
parte Cathey, 451 S.W.3d 1, 19 (Tex. Crim. App. 2014).
70. See id. at 486 (holding that the habeas judge erred by employing the present definition
used by the AAIDD).
71. Id. at 514.
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Revised (WAIS-R) IQ score of 74 accurately and fairly represented his
intellectual functioning.72 Applying the standard error of measurement
(SEM), the CCA determined Moore’s SEM IQ range to be 73 to 83.73
For the second prong, Moore had “not proven by a preponderance of
the evidence that he has significant and related limitations in adaptive
functioning.”74 After reviewing each of the experts’ findings, the CCA
found that Dr. Kristi Compton’s assessment that Moore was not
intellectually disabled was the most credible and reliable.75 Further, the
CCA found that the non-clinical Briseno factors “weigh[ed] heavily
against a finding that applicant’s adaptive deficits, of whatever nature
and degree they may be, [were] related to significantly sub-average
general intellectual functioning.”76 Concerning the third prong, the
CCA found that he had not established that he was intellectually
disabled before the age of eighteen.77 Thus the CCA upheld Moore’s
execution because he failed to show that he suffered “from significantly
sub-average general intellectual functioning” or that any significant
deficits in his adaptive behavior were “related to significantly subaverage general intellectual functioning.”78
In her dissent, Judge Elsa Alcala argued that the CCA was
effectively using a strict IQ cut-off and merely cherry-picked the scores
it desired.79 She further argued that “[i]n light of both Atkins and Hall,
a court reviewing an intellectual-disability claim is compelled to consult
current medical standards in determining whether a particular offender
falls within the medical definition of an intellectually disabled
person.”80
IV. ARGUMENTS
A. Moore’s Arguments
Moore argues that the legal framework in Texas established under
Briseno does not consider current medical expertise and therefore
violates the Eighth Amendment.81 Moore has three primary arguments
72.
73.
74.
75.
76.
77.
78.
79.
80.
81.

Id. at 517–19.
Id. at 519.
Id. at 520.
Id. at 524–25.
Id. at 526.
Id. at 527.
Id.
Id. at 529, 535 (Alcala, J., dissenting).
Id. at 531 (Alcala, J., dissenting).
See Brief for Petitioner, supra note 37, at 49.
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supporting his claim that his execution must be overturned.
First, Moore argues that when courts determine intellectual
disability by ignoring current standards, they violate the Eighth
Amendment.82 According to Moore, Atkins does not give states
“unfettered discretion”83 in defining the scope of intellectual disability;
rather Atkins and Hall “made clear that (1) the Eighth Amendmentmandated inquiry into intellectual disability must be informed by the
medical diagnostic framework and (2) the medical diagnostic
framework is determined by current medical standards.”84 Additionally,
Moore highlights the practical problems associated with states applying
past standards, namely that medical experts would need to diagnose
and evaluate individuals artificially based on old standards.85
Second, Moore argues that even if prohibiting the use of current
medical standards in intellectual disability determinations in death
penalty cases is acceptable under Atkins and Hall, it still violates the
Eighth Amendment.86 According to Moore, the CCA conflicted with
the “medical community’s ‘diagnostic framework,’ by (1) rejecting
consideration of current medical standards and (2) relying on its own
clinically unsound Briseno factors.”87 The CCA allegedly erred when it
put too much weight on the IQ cut-off to determine intellectual
functioning88 and erred when it required Moore “to prove that his
deficits in adaptive functioning were caused specifically and exclusively
by his intellectual deficits.”89
Third, Moore argues that the non-clinical Briseno factors used by
the CCA conflict with current medical consensus.90 According to
Moore, the Briseno factors “arose from the CCA’s explicit distrust of
the clinical framework, which it viewed as “exceedingly subjective.”91
“By relying on lay impressions, stereotypes and non-diagnostic criteria,
the Briseno standard risks allowing the execution of individuals with
intellectual disability—like Moore—whose impairments, though
constitutionally significant, may be less obvious and less severe than

82.
83.
84.
85.
86.
87.
88.
89.
90.
91.

Id. at 27.
See id. at 29.
Id. at 30.
Id. at 31.
See id.
Id. at 32 (internal citations omitted).
Id. at 36.
Id. at 46.
Id. at 49.
Id. at 50.
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those of other individuals.”92 While Texas states that the Briseno factors
are merely an optional aspect of the analysis,93 Moore argues that the
CCA erroneously used the factors too heavily in its determination and
that lower courts have often relied exclusively on them in making
intellectual disability determinations.94
B. Texas’s Arguments
Texas argues that the CCA correctly analyzed and determined that
Moore is not intellectually disabled, and thus it is not unconstitutional
for the state to execute him.95 Texas further argues that the CCA did
not prohibit the use of current medical standards and that Moore’s
actual grievance is that he disagrees with the CCA’s determinations of
the most reliable IQ scores and most credible medical expert.96 Texas
offers four arguments that its legal framework defining intellectual
disability remains constitutional.
First, Texas argues that its definition of intellectual disability
adheres to Atkins.97 According to Texas, Atkins did not require states to
adopt a certain definition for intellectual disability,98 and Hall did not
abolish the states’ role in determining intellectual disability for Atkins
claims.99 The state of Texas specifically adopted and continues to use
the definition from the ninth edition of the AAMR, which is directly
cited in Atkins.100 Additionally, Texas points out that there is no
nationwide consensus among the states as to which clinical definition
ought to be used.101 Further, “[r]equiring States to strictly adhere to
either the APA’s or AAIDD’s latest clinical definition would be
unworkable and unwarranted” because medical organizations’ clinical
definitions differ among themselves.102 Finally, Texas argues that its
legal framework, as laid out in Briseno, remains adequately “informed
by the medical community’s diagnostic framework.”103 Texas claims

92. Id. at 57.
93. Brief for Respondent, supra note 16, at 52.
94. See Reply Brief for Petitioner at 3, Moore v. Texas, No. 15-797 (U.S. Oct. 6, 2016) (citing
Ex parte Sosa, 364 S.W.3d 889 (Tex. Crim. App. 2012)).
95. Brief for Respondent, supra note 16, at 19.
96. Id. at 2.
97. Id. at 19.
98. Id. at 21.
99. Id. at 22.
100. Id. at 33.
101. Id. at 25.
102. Id. at 27–28.
103. Id. at 36 (citing Hall v. Florida, 134 S. Ct. 1986, 1993, 2000 (2014) (emphasis omitted)).
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that the medical standards have not changed significantly enough or
uniformly to warrant a change in its legal framework.104 Further,
because Texas courts rely heavily on medical experts in determining
each individual case, the most up-to-date standards influence each
decision.105
Second, Texas argues that the CCA properly found Moore did not
adequately show he was intellectually disabled.106 Concerning the first
prong of the legal framework, Texas argues that the CCA correctly
narrowed down the list of IQ scores to the most reliable in determining
Moore’s intellectual functioning.107 Concerning the second prong,
Texas argues that the CCA correctly based its findings on the expert
testimony of Dr. Compton.108 Because the experts varied in their
assessments of Moore, the CCA relied primarily on Dr. Compton
because her “qualifications and depth of review made her expert
opinion the most credible.”109 Concerning the third prong, Texas argues
that Moore “failed to meet his burden to show that his asserted
adaptive functioning deficits are directly ‘related’ to his asserted
intellectual functioning deficits”110 because when the factors affecting
Moore’s adaptive functioning were removed from his life due to
imprisonment, he “showed ‘significant advances’ in adaptive
behavior.”111
Third, Texas argues that the non-clinical Briseno factors do not
render its three-prong framework unconstitutional.112 According to
Texas, the Briseno factors are an optional inquiry to assist courts in
determining an individual’s adaptive functioning, and were used in this
case merely to bolster the CCA’s determination that Moore is not
intellectually disabled.113
Finally, Texas argues in the alternative that, if the Court determines
that Texas’s legal framework does not adequately consult current
medical standards, then the Court should establish a national Atkins
standard and remand the case for further review by the CCA.114 Texas
104.
105.
106.
107.
108.
109.
110.
111.
112.
113.
114.

Id. at 31.
Id. at 35–36.
Id. at 38.
Id. at 41.
Id. at 44.
See id. at 45–46 (discussing the weights given to the experts).
Id. at 48.
Id. at 49 (citation omitted).
Id. at 51.
Id. at 52–53.
Id. at 50–51.
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argues that even if a new standard were adopted, Moore would still be
found not to be intellectually disabled based on the expert testimony
already set forth.115
V. ANALYSIS
The Court should hold for Texas and rule that Texas’s legal
framework for determining intellectual disability with regards to the
death penalty adequately conforms to medical standards and thus
follows Atkins and Hall. Holding for Texas would respect the Court’s
precedent established in Atkins and Hall and ensure greater judicial
stability in the face of ever-changing medical standards. Finally, the
trend among the states regarding intellectual disability and the death
penalty shows that the current consensus of decency encompasses
Texas’s legal framework.
A. Atkins and Hall Support a Finding for Texas
In Atkins, the Court explicitly left it to the states the ability to
determine “appropriate ways to enforce the constitutional restriction
upon [their] execution of sentences.”116 The only caveat was that states
must “generally conform” to clinical definitions and standards.117 In Ex
parte Briseno, Texas established that an intellectual disability “is a
disability characterized by: (1) ‘significantly subaverage’ general
intellectual functioning; (2) accompanied by ‘related’ limitations in
adaptive functioning; (3) the onset of which occurs prior to the age of
18.”118 Thus, Texas did just as the Court required in Atkins when it
adopted the definition from the ninth edition of the AAMR, which was
cited in Atkins,119 as its legal framework for determining intellectual
disability.
In Hall, the Court did not take away the states’ discretion to
establish their own definition for intellectual disability.120 Although
Hall described clinical definitions as “a fundamental premise of
Atkins,” it did not require states to adopt an identical, current medical
standard.121 “The legal determination of intellectual disability is distinct
115. Id. at 39.
116. 536 U.S. 304, 317 (2002) (citation omitted).
117. Id. at 317 n.22.
118. 135 S.W.3d 1,7 (Tex. Ct. App. 2004) (quoting AAMR 9th, supra note 56, at 5) (footnotes
omitted); see also Atkins, 536 U.S. at 308 n.3.
119. Atkins, 536 U.S. at 308, n.3.
120. 134 S. Ct. 1986, 2000 (2014).
121. See id. at 1998.
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from a medical diagnosis,” so medical standards do not completely
dictate an Atkins claim.122 The issues with Florida’s intellectual
disability definition in Hall was that it employed a “strict IQ test score
cutoff of 70” and that it treated all individuals on a strict number basis
rather than using a SEM range.123 Here, the CCA narrowed Moore’s IQ
scores to those that the experts found to be a reliable expression of his
intellectual functioning and then used SEM to form his IQ range.124
This range fell above the 70-score line set forth in the definition from
the ninth edition of the AAMR.125 The inquiry did not stop at Moore’s
IQ score, however, but rather the CCA went on to analyze additional
evidence of Moore’s intellectual capacity and adaptive functioning
through the testimony of family, friends, and current medical experts.126
Further, Moore’s claim that the CCA refused to consult any current
medical standards is incorrect. Several experts testified concerning
Moore’s intellectual and adaptive functioning.127 These experts applied
current medical standards as they assessed and analyzed Moore’s
mental capacity,128 so these current standards came into play through
the testimony of the experts.
Finally, the non-clinical Briseno factors are merely an optional tool
that Texas courts may employ to help assess an individual’s adaptive
functioning. As stated above, the CCA has explicitly stated that these
“factors are not part of the definition of ‘intellectual disability,’ and trial
and appellate courts may ignore some or all of them if they are not
helpful in a particular case.”129 Rather, these factors merely help guide
courts through the three-prong test.
B. The Trend Among the States
In Atkins and Hall, the Court considered the death penalty
practices of the thirty-two states that allow the death penalty to
determine society’s view of the “standards of decency” associated with
122. See id. at 2000 (“[T]his determination is informed by the views of medical experts. These
views do not dictate the Court’s decision, yet the Court does not disregard these informed
assessments.”).
123. See id. at 1994–96 (“[T]aking the SEM into account . . . acknowledg[es] the error
inherent in using a test score without necessary adjustment.”).
124. Ex parte Moore, 470 S.W.3d 481, 518–19 (Tex. Crim. App. 2015).
125. Id. at 486.
126. Id. at 520.
127. See id. at 520–24 (describing the experts’ testimony).
128. See id. at 504–05, 509 (stating that each expert used “the tenth (2002) edition of the
AAMR Manual or the DSM-IV, or both”).
129. Ex parte Cathey, 451 S.W.3d 1, 10 n.22 (Tex. Crim. App. 2014).
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the Eighth Amendment.130 Most states believe that current medical
standards should be consulted when determining whether an individual
is intellectually disabled. Although only four states today have
established the most recent definitions of the APA or AAIDD, twentyfour states continue to use past definitions similar to the one adopted
by Texas.131 Even though there is not a complete consensus, a significant
majority of states that allow the death penalty have not adopted the
most current medical standards to determine intellectual disability.132
This near consensus provides an “objective indicia of society’s
standards”133 that strongly suggests Texas’s legal framework is
constitutional. Under the Eighth Amendment, “what counts are our
society’s standards—which is to say, the standards of the American
people—not the standards of professional associations, which at best
represent the views of a small professional elite.”134
C. Policy Implications Support a Finding for Texas
If the Court holds for Moore, states would have to continually
update their legal frameworks to address changes in a field that is
perpetually in flux.135 As there is no consensus among medical
professionals and organizations about the proper definition for
intellectual disability,136 states would have to determine which medical
standard is the “correct” standard at the time.137 For example, the

130. See Hall v. Florida, 134 S. Ct. 1986, 1996 (2014). The Court found:
[A]t most nine States mandate a strict IQ score cutoff at 70. Of these, four States
(Delaware, Kansas, North Carolina, and Washington) appear not to have considered
the issue in their courts. On the other side of the ledger stand the 18 States that have
abolished the death penalty, either in full or for new offenses, and Oregon, which has
suspended the death penalty and executed only two individuals in the past 40 years. In
those States, of course, a person in Hall’s position could not be executed even without
a finding of intellectual disability. Thus in 41 States an individual in Hall’s position—an
individual with an IQ score of 71 — would not be deemed automatically eligible for the
death penalty.
Id. at 1996 (internal citations omitted).
131. See supra Part II.D.
132. See supra note 130 and accompanying text.
133. Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 563 (2005).
134. Hall, 134 S. Ct. at 2005 (Alito, J. dissenting).
135. See id. at 2006 (Alito, J., dissenting) (“[T]he Court’s approach implicitly calls upon the
Judiciary either to follow every new change in the thinking of these professional organizations or
to judge the validity of each new change.”).
136. Brief for Respondent, supra note 16, at 31.
137. See Hall, 134 S. Ct. at 2006 (Alito, J., dissenting) (“[T]he Court’s approach requires the
Judiciary to determine which professional organizations are entitled to special deference. And
what if professional organizations disagree? The Court provides no guidance for deciding which
organizations’ views should govern.”).
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National Institute of Mental Health (NIMH) stated that it will be “reorienting its research away” from the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual
of Mental Disorders (DSM) categories.138 Another example is the most
recent publication of the APA, which drastically changes the first prong
of the longstanding, three-pronged framework of intellectual disability
established in the ninth edition of the AAMR and adopted by most
states.139 Furthermore, sometimes changes made by medical
associations are rescinded several years later.140 As medical
advancements continue, grave judicial instability may ensue. And, this
instability will only fuel long drawn-out litigation and extend the
amount of time someone spends on death row.
The Court should allow states to keep their legal frameworks as
they stand, at least until a significant trend in medical research points
to a substantially different definition of intellectual disability. Trial
courts and appellate courts rely on expert testimony in determining
whether an individual is intellectually disabled.141 These experts will
generally be trained in the current medical standards and will employ
these standards as they evaluate each individual. Thus, Texas’s legal
framework is designed to bring in current medical standards through
the consultation of experts. This will better balance the ever-changing
medical field with the need for judicial stability. Judicial stability
requires the Court to find for Texas.
CONCLUSION
The decision in Moore v. Texas will be critical concerning the
stability of death penalty cases moving forward. The Supreme Court
should find for Texas because the state’s intellectual disability
determination follows the precedent set in Atkins and Hall. Further,
because the medical field is so fluid, requiring states to constantly
change their frameworks will cause judicial instability. Here, Moore was
unable to meet his burden of proving that he was intellectually disabled
under the standard set forth in Atkins and adopted by Texas in Briseno.

138. Brief for Respondent, supra note 16, at 31.
139. See Hall, 134 S. Ct. at 2006 (Alito, J., dissenting) (“In this new publication, the APA
discards ‘significantly subaverage intellectual functioning’ as an element of the intellectualdisability test.”).
140. See id. (Alito, J., dissenting) (“It is also noteworthy that changes adopted by professional
associations are sometimes rescinded[.]”).
141. See Brief for Respondent, supra note 16, at 40.
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While the Court has typically limited the application of the death
penalty through its cases, this case should keep the status quo intact.
With the Court limiting its review of the case to only one question142
and with the trend in the recent election suggesting continued public
support for the death penalty,143 the Court will likely be disinclined to
carve out a deeper intellectual disability exception to the death penalty.

142. See Liptak, supra note 15.
143. See Segura, supra note 3 (discussing how various states have continued to pass death
penalty statutes).

